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The World Health Organization Influenza Program is
one of the best developed and longest running infectious
disease surveillance systems that exists. It maintains a
worldwide watch of influenza’s evolution to assist delivery
of appropriately formulated vaccines in time to blunt sea-
sonal epidemics and unpredictable pandemics. Despite the
program’s success, however, much more is possible with
today’s advanced technologies. This article summarizes
ongoing human influenza surveillance activities worldwide.
It shows that the technology to establish a high-throughput
laboratory network that can process and test influenza
viruses more quickly and more accurately is available. It
also emphasizes the practical public health and scientific
applications of such a network. 
I
nfluenza strikes persons in developing and industrialized
countries alike and is capable of killing healthy persons
of all ages. Among the hardest hit are infants <1 year of
age and adults >65. During any given year, influenza epi-
demics kill 500,000–1,000,000 persons globally, and an
unpredictable pandemic is capable of killing millions (1).
Yet death rate statistics alone do not capture the full impact
of influenza; it causes many hospitalizations, secondary
bacterial pneumonias, and middle ear infections in infants
and young children (2). Worldwide, literally tons of
antimicrobial drugs are used to treat these complications,
and the economic consequences are enormous. For large
populations, the only way to deter influenza is to adminis-
ter vaccines targeted against ever-mutating strains (3). 
Current Surveillance
The World Health Organization (WHO) Influenza
Program was established in 1952 to assist with public
health threats associated with influenza. Today, its network
of 112 national centers in 83 countries collects ≈160,000
samples each year from 600 to 1,200 million persons with
influenza. As shown in Figure 1, the centers screen sam-
ples for influenza viruses and type- (A versus B) and sub-
type- (e.g., A/H1N1, A/H3N2) relevant samples (4).
Certain influenza-positive samples are then forwarded to 1
of 4 WHO collaborating centers for further immunologic
and genetic characterizations. Twice a year, WHO organiz-
es a formal meeting with its collaborating center directors
to review information on circulating influenza strains. This
advisory committee identifies circulating strains that new
vaccine formulations should target. Because influenza epi-
demics peak during the winter months, the committee
offers its recommendations in February and September for
the Northern and Southern Hemispheres, respectively. The
findings are then reviewed by national health authorities
who approve, and occasionally amend, implementation of
the recommended vaccine strains (5). Surveillance for
influenza requires global and national monitoring for both
virus and disease activity to determine when, where, and
which influenza viruses are circulating in the United States
and globally, to determine the intensity and impact of
influenza activity on defined health outcomes and identify
unusual or severe outbreak, and to detect the emergence of
novel influenza viruses that may cause a pandemic.
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s
(CDC) WHO Collaborating Center for Reference and
Research on Influenza supplies standardized reagents and
test kits to all national centers for detecting influenza Aand
B strains, subtyping strains, and determining whether sam-
ple strains are immunologically related to recent vaccine
strains. Typical circulating strains and atypical ones that
appear to differ from vaccine strains are forwarded to 1 of
4 collaborating centers (in the United States, United
Kingdom, Australia, and Japan) for further characteriza-
tion (5). During the 2004–2005 influenza season, CDC’s
center in Atlanta received ≈3,500 strains from domestic
and foreign surveillance. A partial summary of laboratory
methods used is outlined below.
In most situations, 6–10 serum samples are used to
compare sample strains against vaccine and reference
strains, and during any given influenza season, >99% of
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USAsample strains are successfully matched by routine hemag-
glutination inhibition (HI) assays. Laboratory workers
replicate sample strains in cell cultures or fertile eggs and
adjust the resulting viral stocks to a standard hemagglu-
tinin titer. They then use HI assays to determine whether
sample strains are immunologically related (i.e., cross-
reactive) to recent vaccine strains. Typing sera are added to
wells in a series of 2-fold dilutions, and after the reactions
stabilize, laboratory workers score assay wells (positive or
negative) by looking for agglutinated erythrocytes (posi-
tive) that do not form buttons at the bottom of plates ver-
sus non-agglutinated cells (negative) that do form buttons.
For sample strains that behave as variants, laboratory
workers inject them into ferrets to produce a strain-specif-
ic antiserum. When the new antiserum is ready, HI assays
are again performed as above. If the new sera show signif-
icant gaps in cross-reactivity (usually defined as a 4-fold
difference between sample and vaccine strains), they are
incorporated into the routine laboratory set and used to
look for new epidemic strains. Examples of strains that
were identified as variants include A/H3N2/Sydney, which
spread rapidly among persons in 1997, and A/H5N1/Hong
Kong, which jumped from fowl to humans in 1997. During
the 2004–2005 influenza season, ≈3,500 HI assays were
performed.
During the 2004–2005 influenza season, >600 cleaved
hemagglutinin (HA1) domain sequences were analyzed. In
this process, laboratory workers extract viral RNA from
samples, convert viral RNAto cDNA, amplify cDNAwith
polymerase chain reaction (PCR) primers, and analyze
DNA products with capillary array sequencers. They then
compare sample strain sequences against vaccine and ref-
erence strain sequences to determine their phylogenetic
relationships.
During the 2004–2005 influenza season, ≈350 neu-
raminidase (NA) sequences were analyzed to determine
their phylogenetic relationships. For this process, laborato-
ry workers follow similar preparative steps used for HA1
and then use multiple PCR primers to sequence the entire
gene segment. 
During the 2004–2005 influenza season, ≈3,500 single
nucleotide polymorphism (SNP) profiles were analyzed
from circulating strains. For this analysis, laboratory work-
ers follow similar preparative steps used for HA1 and then
use pyrosequencing to detect SNP that confer resistance to
the antiviral drugs amantadine and rimantadine. 
During the 2004–2005 influenza season, ≈120 whole
genomes were sequenced from circulating strains. In this
process, laboratory workers extract viral RNA from sam-
ples, convert viral RNA to cDNA, amplify cDNA with
PCR primers, and analyze DNA products with capillary
array sequencers. Amplification of all 8 gene segments
(PB1, PB2, PA, HA, NP, NA, M1/M2, NS1/NEP) that have
a combined length of ≈13.6 kb requires ≈30 type- and sub-
type-specific PCR primers.
These activities give ≈6 months to vaccine manufactur-
ers on either side of the equator for scale up, production,
and distribution. These activities also give healthcare serv-
ices another 3 months to administer the ≈250 million doses
of trivalent vaccine that are used globally. Despite its
sophistication and scale, however, the WHO Influenza
Program has several shortcomings (6).
First, surveillance gaps exist in many parts of the world
for a variety of reasons, including limited funding, lack of
infrastructure support for surveillance teams and preserv-
ing influenza samples, and intentional underreporting at
the national level (7). Second, current laboratory methods
for characterizing influenza are time-consuming and labor-
intensive and, as a result, relatively few viral strains under-
go definitive phenotyping and genotyping assays (5,8,9).
During the 2004–2005 influenza season, for example, the
4 WHO collaborating centers analyzed ≈6,000 strains, rep-
resenting only 1 sample per 100,000 influenza cases
worldwide (Figure 1). Far fewer strains from domestic
poultry and swine or from wild aquatic birds, which are
thought to serve as precursors for pandemic strains, are
analyzed comprehensively in a given year (10).
Third, with current methods, it can take weeks to
months to generate laboratory data on influenza samples
and understand their significance (Appendix available
online at http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/EID/vol12no04/05-
1198.htm#app). Such prolonged times can impede vaccine
strain selection activities. For example, the vaccine admin-
istered throughout North America in 1997 provided
inadequate protection against the A/H3N2 Sidney strain
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Figure 1. Global influenza surveillance for the 2004–2005 season.
Respiratory samples were collected from persons with febrile res-
piratory illness worldwide. Approximately 15% of samples were
influenza positive. Note that only some of the type A viruses were
subtyped. Data are from the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention website (http://www.cdc.gov/flu/weekly/weekl-
yarchives2004-2005/04-05summary.htm).that spread rapidly from Asia and Australia (11). Public
health officials ascribed the poor match between circulat-
ing strains and vaccine strains to many factors including 1)
less than optimal surveillance, 2) time required to prepare
and ship isolates, 3) lag time in laboratory testing with cur-
rent manual methods, and 4) rapid spread of the Sydney
variant.
Although the program has a remarkably good track
record, it did not detect the Sydney variant in time to
include it in the vaccine before the epidemic. Failure to
detect an emerging influenza virus could prove disastrous
should it be a novel strain with pandemic potential (12).
The 1918 influenza pandemic is the biggest infectious dis-
ease catastrophe on record, topping even the medieval
Black Death. Within months after the initial outbreak, the
A/H1N1 virus struck 500 million persons and killed 40–50
million worldwide when the total population was only 2
billion (13). Subsequent pandemics, brought about by a
shift to A/H2N2 in 1957 and A/H3N2 in 1968, had far
lower death rates. 
Between March and May of 1997, an outbreak of avian
A/H5N1 in Hong Kong killed a child who was otherwise
healthy and thousands of chickens (14). For the next 6
months, no new cases appeared. Between November and
December of 1997, avian A/H5N1 infected 17 people and
killed 5 of them (15,16). Confronted with a case-fatality
ratio of 33%, health authorities took quick action and
opted to destroy all 1.5 million chickens in Hong Kong. It
took nearly 6 months to identify the index case; events
transpired so quickly that manual laboratory methods were
unable to generate all of the information that was needed. 
Since 2004, avian A/H5N1 has caused additional out-
breaks throughout Asia, resulting in >60 human deaths in
Vietnam, Thailand, Cambodia, and Indonesia and the
destruction of 150 million birds (17). In 2005, through a
combination of wild bird migrations and farming practices,
highly pathogenic avian influenza spread to northern
China, Mongolia, Tibet, Kazakhstan, and Russia (18). At
the time of this writing, it had further spread to several
European countries (Turkey, Romania, and Greece) and
threatened to spread to other continents, including Africa
and North America through avian flyways.
The potential of avian A/H5N1 to cause a global human
pandemic is uncertain because it cannot be predicted with
current knowledge (19). Nevertheless, the anticipated eco-
nomic, social, and political consequences are enormous
(20,21). Therefore, we face a compelling demand to
expand the current influenza surveillance system (6,22).
High-throughput Network
In August 2004, the US Department of Health and
Human Services released a draft of its Pandemic Influenza
Response and Preparedness Plan. The plan’s surveillance
annex offered specific recommendations for system
enhancements and next steps (5). Many of these enhance-
ments could be achieved by developing a high-throughput
laboratory network that would expand the capabilities of
the existing WHO collaborating centers on influenza
(6,22). With such enhancements, WHO national centers
would be able to collect samples from people with febrile
respiratory illnesses, record epidemiologic observations,
and send samples directly to the high-throughput network.
At each site, high-throughput automated systems would
collaborate, and epidemiologic observations and test
results would appear in the laboratory’s web-enabled data-
base for analysis within days (23). Internet-based capabil-
ities would allow WHO national centers to examine their
own data and improve surveillance in an iterative manner
(Figure 2). In tracking changes in epidemic strains, the
new system would facilitate nonbiased proportional sam-
pling of persons with febrile respiratory illnesses in an iter-
ative fashion. In detecting the emergence of novel strains
with pandemic potential, the new system would facilitate
the use of rapid and more sensitive methods.
The plan integrates available biologic, engineering, and
informatic technologies into a networked capability and
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Figure 2. Flow chart for utilizing the high-throughput laboratory
network.makes them available through the Internet (23). Influenza
is well suited to this approach because of its obvious pub-
lic health implications, but also because a well-established
infrastructure that includes global surveillance, standard-
ized laboratory methods, surveillance-based recommenda-
tions, and targeted vaccines already exists (6,22). Key
elements are shown in Figure 2. 
Platform-independent software that facilitates influenza
surveillance would be provided by the high-throughput
network (23). Internet-based tools would manage laborato-
ry access, epidemiologic questionnaires, testing instruc-
tions, sample submission, data analysis, and data
privileges. The release of data to other users or entities
would be controlled by the submitting organization or
authority. More importantly, the WHO committee and
national health authorities that recommend and review
vaccine strains and antiviral drugs would have access to all
the data.
On average, 1 of every 6 samples collected from per-
sons with febrile respiratory illnesses contains influenza A
or B viruses (24). The remainder contain other viral and
bacterial pathogens. To expedite data collection, surveil-
lance teams could use influenza dipsticks to screen sam-
ples on the spot. Several companies make diagnostic kits
for influenza A and B; although these tests have certain
disadvantages (limited sensitivity and specificity of
immunoassays), their underlying technologies can form
the basis for improved influenza screening and sampling
devices (2). Such influenza dipsticks—or even portable
PCR-based assays—would make it easier for teams in the
field to screen out negative samples and focus on docu-
menting epidemiologic information on positive ones.
An epidemiologic questionnaire would be provided to
surveillance teams, with a menu that covers key questions
(23). What are the collection date and location? Who is the
host (human versus animal)? What is the age of the host?
What is the physiologic source of the sample? What is the
observed or reported severity of illness? What is the
observed or reported outcome of illness? Which influenza
vaccine or antiviral agents were administered? What are
the likely exposures? Is there any recent travel history?
The questionnaire would run on inexpensive handheld
devices (e.g., personal digital assistants) or cell phones.
Bar codes would be used to link samples to their corre-
sponding questionnaires. Completed questionnaires would
be sent by email to the high-throughput laboratory net-
work, where questionnaire and laboratory data would form
the basis for seeking associations on factors that influence
virulence, transmissibility, and host range (19). 
Current high-throughput automated laboratory systems
are capable of operating 24 hours a day. At each networked
site, epidemiologic questionnaires and instructions would
arrive by the Internet, and bar coded samples would arrive
by air freight. Larger sites could operate systems for geno-
typing, phenotyping, replicating, and archiving influenza
viruses. Smaller sites could operate systems for genotyp-
ing and archiving viruses. In serving as resources, each site
would provide reagents and supplies for analyzing all
influenza subtypes. They would also perform control
assays on a daily basis and maintain a quality assurance
program, the documentation of which would be stored in
the database. Automated laboratory methods would build
upon manual methods currently in use and, because they
can reduce working (liquid) volumes by at least 5- to 10-
fold, they would enable economies of scale (23,25).
Genotyping systems would have flexibility to sequence
all 8 RNA segments or any individual segment from
influenza viruses. The various steps performed would
include transcription viral RNA into cDNA, selection of
optimal PCR primers, amplification of DNA by PCR, and
analysis by capillary array DNA sequencers (26–28).
Influenza viruses are often propagated in cell cultures or
embryonated eggs to obtain enough viral RNA for
sequencing. Newer methods that avoid this growth step,
however, would facilitate direct high-throughput analysis
of native samples from surveillance, including active sam-
ples preserved by cold chain as well as inactive samples
preserved by ethanol fixation (29).
Phenotyping systems would conduct HI and neu-
raminidase inhibition (NI) assays. HI assays are easily
adaptable to automation, but they require relatively large
quantities of virus and typing sera (8). To overcome this
drawback, automated methods that use flow cytometry are
under development (30). They work by attaching mono-
clonal or polyclonal typing sera to a set of color-coded
(multiplexed) beads and detecting the interaction of
influenza with such beads. A high-throughput system that
performs HI assays in parallel with flow cytometer–based
assays, for example, may offer the best means to test and
validate improved influenza serotyping methods. NI
assays are also easily adaptable to automation, particularly
newer ones that use a chemiluminescent sialic acid sub-
strate instead of a fluorogenic substrate (31). They work by
mixing substrate with neuraminidase from sample strains
and measuring the chemiluminescent signal over time.
When performed over a range of inhibitor or antiviral drug
(oseltamivir and zanamivir) concentrations, they enable
the determination of the 50% inhibitory concentration
(IC50) for individual drugs and strains (32).
A replicating system would verify that influenza A and
B antigens are present in samples and set aside negative
ones (33). Positive samples would be injected into cell cul-
tures or embryonated eggs and, several days later, auto-
matically harvested, assayed for HA titers, and adjusted to
uniform concentrations. A part of this fresh stock would
then go to the long-term storage system.
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an extended time. The archiving system would take stocks
from the replication system and place them into modular
bar-coded storage containers, which would then be placed
into freezers. Every step in the storage and retrieval
process would be recorded by bar code scanners and man-
aged by an inventory tracking program (23).
Expanded Surveillance
Influenza virus evolves through a combination of point
mutations (drifts) and reassortment events (shifts) in its
gene segments. For vaccine strain selection, laboratory
methods for characterizing influenza have focused prima-
rily on changes in hemagglutinin and neuraminidase (and
to a much lesser extent on the M2 ion channel protein)
because immunity against these surface proteins is protec-
tive (2). The emphasis on immune-inducing proteins is
clearly practical, but it may overlook changes in the
remaining gene segments (26).
Whole-genome sequencing and phylogenetic analysis
of 156 A/H3N2 viruses that infected humans in New York
from 1999 to 2004 shows 2 substantial findings (28). The
first is that multiple influenza strains co-circulated in
humans over time, with strains falling into 1 of 3 distinct
clades. The second is that mixing between these clades
occurred over short intervals of time, resulting in at least 4
reassortment events among the strains analyzed (28). One
such reassortment event (shift), rather than a point muta-
tion (drift), appears to explain the emergence of the
A/Fujian/411/2002-like strain that caused an epidemic dur-
ing the 2003–2004 influenza season. Similar findings on
A/H3N2 viruses that infected humans in Australia and
New Zealand from 2003 to 2004 have also been reported
(27). In this instance, swaps of neuraminidase and 3 inter-
nal genes (NS1/NEP, NP, M1/M2) were found. Both inde-
pendent findings show that influenza A virus is less
restricted than previously believed and that reassortment
events can occur without warning. Altogether, these new
findings underscore the importance of rapid, whole-
genome analysis for future influenza surveillance (28).
The high-throughput laboratory network would give
rise to 3 domains of associated data from surveillance (34).
Epidemiologic data would pertain to dates, locations,
hosts, outcomes, histories, and exposures. Genotypic data
would pertain to the exact sequence of nucleotides in all 8
viral RNA segments. Phenotypic date would pertain to
immunologic pedigrees (HI titers) and antiviral drug sensi-
tivities (IC50) of sample strains. Some practical public
health and scientific uses of such organized data follow.
New influenza vaccines are often introduced after 3 cri-
teria have been met (25). First, a new strain is identified by
laboratory-based methods. Second, geographic spread of
the new strain is associated with human illness. Third, the
most recent influenza vaccine stimulates a reduced
immunologic response to the new strain. Given these crite-
ria, the high-throughput laboratory network would help in
2 ways. It would provide faster information for vaccine
strain selection, potentially saving 1–2 months in vaccine
delivery. It would also continuously monitor for the emer-
gence of escaping influenza strains and guide critical deci-
sions to update pandemic vaccines or use them in
combination with limited supplies of antiviral drugs (19).
Researchers and drug companies are developing modern
methods (based on reverse genetics and cell cultures, for
example) to manufacture influenza vaccines that could cut
delivery times in half (2,35). Within the next few years,
these new methods, in combination with a high-throughput
network, could save additional vaccine delivery time and
save lives (6,19).
Fifteen hemagglutinin (H1–H15) and 9 neuraminidase
(N1–N9) subtypes diverge by as much as 50% in their
overall amino acid composition. Within each subtype,
smaller amino acid substitutions (drifts) that enable
influenza viruses to evade preexisting immunity exist
(2,3). Although sequencing influenza viruses is useful for
understanding viral mixing and evolution, it cannot delin-
eate how immunologic (i.e., drift and shift) variants relate
to one another at the amino acid and RNA coding levels.
To develop such understanding, a large base of phenotyp-
ic data must be associated with its corresponding genotyp-
ic data. For each receptor subtype, phenotypic data would
consist of HI titers and genotypic data would consist of
RNA sequences from the same virus. Building a rough
association matrix would be the first step in understanding
how variants relate to one another at the amino acid and
RNA levels.
Subsequently, a more complete association matrix
would be used to develop models that could predict
whether viral strains are immunologically related from
sequences alone. Such efforts could help develop influen-
za vaccines that protect against a wider range of variants
and establish a more fundamental molecular basis for
influenza surveillance (25).
Researchers have proposed using antiviral drugs such
as oseltamivir to halt an avian influenza outbreak in
humans (36,37). The strategy would require stockpiling
millions of doses and administering them to persons in the
epicenter and surrounding areas within weeks. Immediate
recognition of the outbreak and rapid surveillance to deter-
mine its size would be essential. Drug-resistant avian
influenza viruses would likely emerge at some point, rep-
resenting a potential threat to emergency control efforts,
and health authorities would need real-time information on
where the viruses were found and how many of them exist-
ed (38). Such emergency interventions would generate
thousands of samples for laboratory analysis within days.
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laboratory network may be the only feasible means to meet
the challenge.
Implementation
The spreading avian A/H5N1 outbreak poses serious
threats to the health, economy, and security of the world
(22). It has motivated political leaders and health officials
to increase financial support for influenza surveillance and
to seek agreements and incentives that promote informa-
tion sharing and international cooperation (39). Effective
measures will require real-time, accurate, and comprehen-
sive information to make rapid public health decisions.
The first 2 sites in a high-throughput laboratory net-
work could be up and running in 12–18 months at a cost of
$15 million. It would generate epidemiologic, genotypic,
and phenotypic data as described in this article. With avail-
able technologies and methods, each site would be capable
of analyzing up to 10,000 samples per year, a substantial
improvement over current capabilities. Implementing mul-
tiple sites worldwide (at the 4 WHO collaborating centers,
for example) would enable regional collaborations and
help encourage the timely sharing of samples and informa-
tion (40).
Human history shows that an influenza pandemic is
years overdue (41). Moreover, whole-genome sequencing
of influenza virus shows dynamic RNA segments that are
capable of epidemiologically meaningful reassortment
events (27,28). Whether avian A/H5N1 will be the precur-
sor strain is unknown. However, we must expand, speed
up, and connect human and animal surveillance efforts
today, which must be matched with an expanded capacity
to produce and deliver influenza vaccines worldwide.
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